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COMMENT
SOME FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN REAL PROP-
ERTY IDEAS OF THE "CIVIL LAW" AND THE
COMMON LAW SYSTEMS*
MAX RHUMISTEINt
ACOMPARISON of the real property law ideas and approaches of
Sthe civil law and the common law encounters the initial diffi-
culty that there is no longer such a thing as "Civil Law." The
laws of those countries which are more or less based on the Roman law
are widely different from one another at the present time.z Yet there are
certain common features, which I shall attempt to emphasize. Where it is
necessary to go into more detail, attention shall be paid principally to the
law of Germany, not only because it is the system with which I happen to
be most familiar, but particularly because it is contained in one of the
most recent and most elaborate of the great European codes.2
* This paper was read in December, 1935, before the Round Table on Property and Status
at the meeting of the American Law School Association in New Orleans. The references to
code provisions and literature were added for its publication here; it has not been changed or
enlarged, however. It is intended as an expression of a few ideas in the form of a sketch, with
the hope that the author may obtain knowledge of individual reactions for use in future work.
t Assistant Professor of Law, holder of Max Parn Professorship, University of Chicago Law
School.
I In the discussion following the presentation of this paper, Dean Pound observed that in the
common law jurisdictions as well, modem legislation and other factors have brought about con-
siderable differences in the laws actually in force in the various jurisdictions. However, the
"Common Law" is still felt to be a single system: it is still taught as such in English and espe-
cially American universities, and even "restated." In Europe the consciousness of a common
background has been lost through the nationalization of the laws of the various countries.
What is taught in the universities is French, German, Italian, or some other national law.
Roman common law finds no more than historical interest. No one would even think of re-
stating the no longer existing "Civil Law," the last remains of which lost actual interest when
the Roman common law was superseded in Germany by the new Civil Code. Cf. also, in this
respect, Rheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
232 (1935).
2German Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, usually abbreviated B. G. B.) of August 18,
1896. Of a more recent date are the civil codes of Switzerland (December io, 1907) (which has
been almost literally adopted by the Turkish Republic), Brazil, Liechtenstein, Guatemala,
Siam, Iran, and the various Soviet Republics. All these codes were considerably influenced
by the German code.
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The existence of these codes marks the first great difference between
common law and civil law. In all the civil law countries, codification
meant a fresh start, a great housecleaning, where antiquated rules and
institutions were weeded out. New consistent rules were worked out, un-
hampered by ideas developed in and adapted to the needs of past ages. 3
In the field of the land laws this re-shaping was perhaps more radical than
in other fields.4
This process of destruction and re-building was principally guided by
two policies: (i) the desire to suppress the political power of the landed
aristocracy; and (2) the idea of economic liberalism: the common good
would be served best by the greatest possible marketability of the land,
the result expected being that every piece of land would always be in the
ablest and fittest hands.
Two principal legal means were used for giving effect to these policies:
I. Restraints on alienation were curtailed or even almost entirely
suppressed.
II. A system of conveyancing was established which was intended
not only to simplify the formalities of land transactions but also to
guarantee the utmost security for bona fide purchasers and mortgagees.
I
The first means was not only aimed at the landed classes but also con-
sciously used for the purpose of giving greater security to land transac-
tions, since it became apparent at an early date that without a radical
simplification of the substantive law of real property no conveyancing re-
form would be able to achieve the desired end.
Restraints on alienation existed in the civil law countries, although never
to the same extent as in England. They were partly traditional, based upon
old forms of community property of the family or the village; partly,
their foundation lay, as in England, in feudal ideas and institutions s But
these were almost entirely swept away in the reforms of the nineteenth
century.
In the common law, there exists another form of restraint on aliena-
'On these reforms, cf. "The Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century," by
various authors, xi Continental Legal History Series 25I ft. (I918).
4 The standard work on the nineteenth century continental reforms of the land laws is
Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, Die Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im ig. Jahrhundert (2 vols. 1918,
1930).
s For detailed information, see Rudolf Huebner, History of Germanic Private Law, 4 Conti-
nental Legal History Series 3ig ff., 395 if., 758 ff. (I9g8); Jean Brissaud, History of French
Private Law, 3 Continental Legal History Series 30ff., 426 ff. (1912).
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tions, i.e., one which is created by a legal transaction of an individual who
wishes to fix the legal fate of a certain piece of property for a more or less
distant future. The technical means by which such a desire can be ful-
filled is the future interest. The civil law has developed a rather different
institution, the fideicommissary substitutions. By means of this device a
person fixes the future fate not of any individual object but only of his
estate as a whole. Furthermore, and in contrast to the common law, this
can only be done by an instrument of a testamentary nature. By using
the so-called fideicommissum universale a person could provide that upon
his death the heir of his heir6 should be obliged to hand over the entire
estate to some other person, the fideicommissary. 7 Local developments,
especially in Germany, subsequently changed this institution to the so-
called "Nacherbfolge," (reversionary heirship) under which a testator
may provide that upon his death his entire estate should pass to A,
and after A's death, or upon some other event, immediately to B, and
eventually, upon some further event, even to a third person. He may not
make such a provision, however, with respect to a particular piece of land,
Blackacre or Whiteacre. 8
If T dies leaving his estate to A for life and then to B, the former, on
principle, becomes the free and unrestricted owner of the entire estate.
He has the power and, on principle, the right to alienate everything.9 On
the other hand, he is bound to hand over to B "the estate," i.e., its eco-
nomic value. Whenever he sells an object belonging to the estate, the
proceeds or whatever he buys with them take its place."' Hence it follows
that he is not allowed to make gifts, except with the consent of the "sec-
ondary heir" or heirs, as the case may be. Any gift made out of the estate
without such consent is invalid."
6 Throughout this paper, the word "heir" is not used in its technical common law meaning,
but as a translation of the civil law term "heres" (French "h6ritier," German "Erbe," Italian
"erede," Spanish "heredero") meaning that person to whom the decedent's estate passes as an
entirety immediately upon death; cf. Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of
the Debts of Deceased Persons, 20 Iowa L. J. 431 (i935).
7 Cf., e.g., D. 35.2.95. pr., 36.127.16, 36.1.57.1.
8 See Germ. Civ. Code §§ 21oo-46; Swiss Civ. Code arts. 488-92; Austrian Civ. Code §§ 604
el seq. (Cf. 2 Ehrenzweig, System des bsterreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts, 11, 432 (6th ed.
1924)).
9 Cf. Germ. Civ. Code § 2112; Swiss Civ. Code art. 491.
xo Germ. Civ. Code § 2111.
I, This is expressly provided in Germ. Civ. Code § 2113, 2d par. The gift is invalid "in so
far as it would frustrate or impair the rights of the reversionary heir." The prohibition does
not apply to gifts which are made in consideration of a moral duty or of a duty of social
etiquette.
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On principle, he should be allowed to sell freely any piece of land be-
longing to the estate. However, land is regarded as such an important
asset that modern German law provides for an exception. Any sale of
land made by a primary heir out of the estate without the consent of the
secondary heir or heirs is invalid in so far as it impairs the rights of the
latter. 2 On the other hand, the primary heir is possessor and owner of the
land and registered as such in the Land Register. In order to protect
third parties, however, the Land Registry is required to enter on the
Land Register, on its own motion, a notice that the person entered as
owner is merely a primary heir.' 3 Unless this notice has been entered,
bona fide purchasers and mortgagees will acquire a good title from the
primary heir.' 4
A secondary heir may be appointed upon a certain or an uncertain
event. It may be certain or uncertain that the position of the primary
heir will be terminated. A husband, for instance, may appoint his wife
his heir until her remarriage, or until her death, and from then on B or,
if B should be dead, C. Thus, legal situations may be created very similar
to the future interests and expectancies under the common law.
However, the instrument creating such interests must be a will. No
"future interest" can be created by an inter vivos transaction. Yet, there
exists a legal transaction which, though in testamentary form, strikingly
resembles an inter vivos transaction, the "pacts of inheritance."' s A person
may make a will in the form of an agreement. A, in an agreement with B,
may appoint B or C as his heir. This is more than a contract by which A
would undertake to make such and such a will. The agreement is the will,
which is irrevocable without the other party's consent. It is possible and
usual for both parties to such "pacts of inheritance" to make dispositions
as to their respective estates. Such reciprocal "pacts of inheritance" may
be combined in one document with an agreement in which future or pres-
ent spouses fix their respective rights in each other's property. Such
"pacts of matrimony and inheritance" fulfill the functions of an English
marriage settlement. Yet, while an English marriage settlement will refer
to Blackacre or Whiteacre, the German document refers to the respective
estates as entireties, and only indirectly will it affect the individual pieces
of land belonging to the parties at the time of their deaths.
-Germ. Civ. Code § 2X13, ist par.
23 Land Registry Regulation § 52. 14 Germ. Civ. Code § 2113, 3d par.
IS Erbvertrag. Germ. Civ. Code §§ 2279-2302; Swiss Civ. Code arts. 494-7; Austrian Civ.
Code (permitted only as between husband and wife) §§ 602, 1249 el seq. As to its history, see
Huebner, op. cit. supra note 5, at 746.
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The law must take care, moreover, of a person's desire to exempt a par-
ticular thing from the general fate of his estate. One may desire his estate
to go to A; Blackacre, however, to B. He may effect his purpose by means
of a legacy. However, there is a difference between a common law devise
and the modern civil law legacy. If under the common law a man devises
Blackacre to B, title passes to B immediately upon the testator's death.
In Germany title passes to the heir; all B acquires is a claim against the
heir, which can be defeated by the heir's conveying the land to a third
party. Then B has nothing more than a claim for damages against the
heir. 6
By means of a special type of legacy, a testator may provide that the
heir shall convey Blackacre to B, and that, after B's death, B's heir shall
convey it to C. By this device, the legatum fideicommissarium ("Nach-
vermdchtnis"), 17 nothing more can be created than claims in personam
against the person charged with their execution. Yet, modem German
law has developed a means by which the "future legatee" may protect his
claim against defeat by adverse dispositions of the primary legatee. He
may enter upon the land register a warning by which the public is notified
of his future claim. The present owner is not prevented thereby from
transferring the title to third persons, but he can only give them a title
which is defeasible upon the maturity of the claim of the "future lega-
tee." " This protection comes in its effect very near to an Anglo-American
future interest.
The rule that future interests can be created only with respect to an
estate as a whole, is a consequence of that peculiar attitude of the civil
law which finds its theoretical expression in the distinction made there
between law of property and law of succession. While the former looks to
single objects and their transfer inter vivos, the latter regulates succession
upon death which is always conceived of as a so-called universal succes-
A Germ. Civ. Code §§ 1939, 2147, 2174; Swiss Civ. Code arts. 481, 484-6; Austrian Civ.
Code §§ 535, 647 et seq. The legacy has also been embodied in the French Code (art. 1014 ef
seq.), and in the codes of those numerous other countries which follow the French pattern
(cf., e.g., the Italian Civil Code arts. 76o, 827, 862 et seq.; Roumanian Civil Code arts. 887,
899 ef seq.; Spanish Civil Code art. 858 et seq.). Under Roman law, it was not only possible to
charge the heir with a duty to hand over a certain object to the legatee (legaturn per damna-
tionern), but also, just as under common law, to devise a certain thing in such a way that the
legatee acquired the title immediately on the testator's death (legalurn per vindicationem).
X7 Roman law: af. D. 32.39. pr., 35.1.36.1, C. 6. 53.2. Modem laws: Germ. Civ. Code
§ 2191; Swiss Civ. Code art. 488, 3 d par.; Austrian Civ. Code § 652; for the laws of the French
system, see p. 63o infra.
is Germ. Civ. Code § 883.
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sion, i.e., succession to a person's entire estate.' 9 In the classical common
law, universal succession applied to personal property only, i.e., to that
part of a deceased person's property which was taken care of in England
by the ecclesiastical courts, which based their rules not on common law
but on civil law ideas. While these courts developed the rule that a de-
ceased man's personal estate passed to his personal representative as an
entirety, the common law courts treated each piece of land as a separate
unit.2 They did so, for example, with respect to venue, the conflict of
laws, or the dower and curtesy rights of a surviving spouse. In the civil
law, on the other hand, those rights which might be regarded as analogous
to dower and curtesy refer only to the estate as a whole, i.e., to those ob-
jects which happen to belong to the estate at the moment of the precedent
spouse's death. To express it in common law terms: The rights of the sur-
viving spouse can be defeated by an alienation inter vivos. It is merely one
consequence of this general policy that future interests can be created
only with respect to an estate as a whole, and only by testamentary trans-
actions.
However, an exception persisted during a certain period. In the late
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the same period during which in-
ventive English lawyers responded to the desires of the English landed
aristocracy by the invention of the "family settlement, ' 121 continental law-
yers developed for the same purpose the so-called "fideicommissa fami-
liarum."'' This institution could be used to settle, by a testamentary or
inter vivos "act of settlement," a piece of land with its fixtures and ap-
purtenances (usually a large manor) so as to make it inalienable, indivisi-
ble, unmortgageable, exempt from execution, and subject to inheritance
by primogeniture or some other system of entailed succession. Usually,
care was taken to provide for all possible eventualities and contingencies,
19 As to this principle of "universal succession," cf. Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law
206 et seq. (2d ed. 1932); Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law 4o6 ff. (Ledlie's transl. 1892); see
also Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 6.
20 In this respect the common law kept in line with the general ideas of the Germanic laws;
Cf. 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 253 ff. (i895); Huebner, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 699 ff.
21 Cf. 7 Holdsworth, History of English Law 112 (1926); Pollock, Land Laws, pt. I (3d
ed. x896).
-As to their history, cf. Huebner, op. cit. supra note 5, at 310 ff., 761 ff. A comparative
survey of the systems of thesefteiommissa as they were developed in the various countries of
Europe will be found in an article by Kuebler and Beutner, 3 Rechtsvergleichendes Handw6r-
terbuch 342-68 (1931), and in Otto v. Gierke's article in 4 Handw6rterbuch der Staatswissen-
schaften io4 (3d ed. i9o9).
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so that there were rights not only analogous to reversions but also to
vested and contingent remainders and even to powers of appointment.
The institution was worked out by ingeniously combining Roman law
with feudal and Germanic ideas which had survived the "reception. ' '23
Its use was, naturally, limited to the wealthy landed classes, i.e., the
aristocracy. In some countries, e.g., in Bavaria, it was even formally re-
served to the members of the nobility.
This device by which an individual manor or another piece of land could
be inalienably settled upon the members of the settlor's family, was
swept away in France by the Revolution.24 It was looked upon, properly,
as one of the basic foundations of the power of the nobility. In order to
prevent its resurrection under disguise, the French Civil Code forbade
even the "universal fideicommiss" and the "fideicommissary legacy. ' '25 On
principle-there are a few exceptions?6-no property can be left in France
otherwise than in free, unrestricted ownership.27 Not only the fear of
aristocratic power, but also the belief that any bindings of the land were an
economic evil, were among the basic dogmas of the French Revolution.2
8
Many other countries followed the French example; not all, however, with
the same radicalism.
23 The Roman law basis was the so-called "fidecommissum quod familiae relinquitur," a
fideicommissum in the sense as explained on p. 626 supra, with the peculiar feature that each
successive fideicommissary was bound to leave the estate to a member of the family of the tes-
tor. Under the Corpus Juris, such a provision was valid for four generations (Nov. i59).
It was fused with the feudal law institution of "succession ex pacto a providentia taiorum"
and the practice of entails, as it was especially developed in the Spanish institution of "ma-
jorado."
24 Law of November 14, 1792.
2s French Civ. Code art. 896: "Substitutions are prohibited. Every disposition by which a
donee, a testamentary heir, or a legatee is charged with preserving [the estate] and to hand it
over to a third person, is void, even as to the donee, the testamentary heir, or the legatee."
26 See id., art. 897 which, combined with arts. 1048-79, permits certain dispositions in favor
of the grandchildren of a donor or testator, or of the children of his brothers and sisters; cf. also
p. 632 infra, as to the usufruct.
27 For details of the French law, see 5 Planiol et Ripert (et Trasbot), Trait6 pratique de
droit civil frangais 291 ff., 852 ff. (i933); shorter, 3 Colin et Capitant, Cours 6l6mentaire de
droit civil frangais 944 if. (1916); Josserand, Cours de droit civil positif frangais 951 (1930);
3 Planiol, Trait6 616mentaire de droit civil 942 ff. (iith ed. 1932). The courts to a certain extent
admit dispositions by which an estate or a particular thing is left to A under a condition subse-
quent, and to B under the same condition working as condition precedent. Thus T may leave
his estate to A, and in case of A's dying without children, to B. A's.power to dispose of the
estate can be in no way affected, however, by such a disposition. In case of the happening of
the condition, B will obtain nothing more than what has been left by A. A further limitation
is that B must have been alive or conceived at the moment of T's death.
28 Cf. Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois, v. 9 (1798); see also Aron, 25 Nouvelle revue his-
torique de droit 468, 586 (i9oI).
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The German Civil Code of 1896 expressly admitted the "fideicommissa
universalia" (Nacherbfolge),29 subject only to a rule against perpetuities,
which is similar to the English rule, though less refined.30 The legatum
fideicommissarium creating obligations with respect to specific property
also remains under the code.3
The "fideicommissumfamiliarum," on the other hand, was left outside
the scope of the German code. It was left to the states to retain or abolish
this aristocratic institution. 32 In spite of numerous attacks on political
and economic grounds, it was left intact in all the states until the Revolu-
tion of 1919, which initiated extensive detailed legislation for the enfran-
chisement of the settled lands,33 whereby the rights of the first, and some-
times even of the second remainderman were carefully preserved. Hence,
at the present moment, there are still many settled lands in Germany
which, however, are bound to disappear within two generations at the
latest. Perhaps family corporations may develop as substitutes. 34
On the other hand, the National-Socialist regime has created a new
29 Cf. p. 626 sumra.
30 Sec. 2109: "The appointment of a reversionary heir (or legatee) becomes inoperative
after the lapse of thirty years since the testator's death, unless the condition for the reversion-
ary succession has happened within such period. The appointment remains operative, how-
ever, even after the lapse of thirty years, (z) if the reversionary heir has been appointed under
the condition of a certain event happening with reference to the person of the primary heir or
the reversionary heir, provided the person with reference to whom the event is to happen was
living at the time of the testator's death; (2) if a brother or sister of the primary or a re-
versionary heir has been appointed as reversionary heir. If the primary or reversionary heir
with reference to whom the condition is to occur is a juristic person, the period of thirty years
will not be enlarged."
Cf. also the following provisions of the Austrian Civil Code:
"§ 611. The number of reversionary heirs is not limited, provided they are all contemporaries
of the testator; thus there may be three, four, or even more reversionary heirs.
"§ 612. If the reversionary heirs are not contemporaries of the testator but born after the
time when he made his will, no disposition as to moneys or any movables is valid beyond the
second degree, and no disposition as to land is valid beyond the first degree." This provision
means that one unborn reversionary heir may be appointed as to land, and two as to movables.
See Rappaport, 2 Kang's Kommentar zum allgemeinen birgerlichen Gesetzbuch, pt. I,
p. 236 (1935).
Under the Swiss Code, no more than one reversionary heir may be appointed (art. 488,
2d par.).
31 Cf. p. 628 supra.
32 Introductory Law to the Civil Code of Aug. 18, 1896, art. 59, R. G. El. 1896, 604.
33 The principle was laid down in art. 155 of the Weimer Constitution of August ii, 1919;
as to the details, see Kuebler and Beutner, op. cit. supra note 22; also Martin Wolff, 3 Ennec-
cerus, Kipp, and Wolff, Lehrbuch des bliirgerlichen Rechts 325 ff. (9 th ed. 1932).
34 Thus, for instance, the former Royal House of Saxony has set up a limited company under
the name of "Haus Wettin, Ltd."
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form of settled lands, settled not by the will and private act of any indi-
vidual but by the will of the state. By law of September 29, 1933,15 all
middle-sized peasants' farms have been rendered inalienable and indivisi-
ble. Their owner can dispose of them neither inter vivos nor by will. Upon
his death, they pass undivided to the youngest, or in certain parts of the
country, to the eldest son.
36
Thus, the National Socialist regime has returned to the idea that a
man's land does not belong to his estate, that his personalty goes a sepa-
rate way, and that land is subject to particular rights, to inalienable future
interests.
Another method of fixing the fate of a particular object as such, and
not only as a part of an estate, has been retained in all civil law countries.
Everywhere a piece of land can be made the subject-matter of a usu-
fruct for life.37 This interest in almost all important respects resembles
the common law estate for life. By transaction inter vivos or testamentary,
the owner may create a usufruct for a certain person and then, of course,
dispose of the fraction of the right of ownership which is retained by him.
This interest in many ways resembles a reversion. Neither the right of the
usufructuary, however, nor the "reversion" is regarded as an "estate."
The usufruct is looked upon as a "servitude," a combination of extensive
easements and profits in the land of another. The "reversion" is not a
future interest but simply that surplus of the rights incident to ownership
which are not vested in the usufructuary and not incompatible with the
latter's rights.
Thus usufruct and, in Germany and some other countries, the fidei-
commissary substitutions are still available for fulfilling a person's desire
to provide, within limits, for the future fate of his property. Yet it seems
that they are not extensively used beyond settling an estate first to the
surviving spouse and then to the children of a testator. Of course, as long
as statistics are lacking, such a statement cannot be based on more than
subjective impressions, founded partly on personal experience, and partly
on the dearth of decisions and lack of interest in the subject shown in
legal literature. Although the present law of Germany affords quite a
variety of means for "settling" property, I think that it can safely be said
's R. G. B1. 1933, I, 685.
36 See Kaden, The Peasant Inheritance Law in Germany, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 350 (1935).
37 Cf., e.g., Germ. Civ. Code § io3o et seq.; Austrian Civ. Code § 5og et seq; Swiss Civ. Code
art. 745 et seq.; French Civ. Code art. 578 et seq.; Ital. Civ. Code art. 477 et seq.; Span. Civ. Code
art. 467 et seq. For a comparative survey of the various modem systems of usufruct, see
Rheinstein, 5 Rechtsvergleichendes Handw6rterbuch 431 (1935).
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that the only extensive use made of them is for providing for a surviving
spouse, who will usually be appointed the other spouse's primary heir,
with the children or other relatives as secondary heirs. Provisions as to
more distant events and eventualities seem to be rare. Nothing more than
guessing is possible as to the causes of this difference from the customs of
Anglo-American countries. One reason may be the greater rareness of
large fortunes; it may also be that impulses associated with economic in-
dividualism and limits on feudal power have affected common practices;
another reason may be the great consciousness of the continental nations
of the instability of expectations, of the futility of provisions for the fu-
ture. Nations which have gone through the experiences of succeeding
wars, revolutions, and inflations, are less convinced of the permanency of
present conditions than nations which for centuries have not seen an in-
vading enemy and whose chief experiences in instability are the periodic
crises of the capitalist system.
II
The policy against restraints on alienation is, as already mentioned,
not only directed against an undue growth of the economic power of the
landed classes, but is also directed toward facilitating the transferability
of the land.
Another means to the same end is the comparative simplicity of the
system of "rights in rem," especially the absence of "equities."' 38 The
task of research to which a purchaser or mortgagee is put is greatly light-
ened by the comparative simplicity of transactions, and particularly by
the absence of rights of other persons "constructive notice" of which may
be fatal.
Simplicity of the substantive law of real property is also indispensable
for the proper functioning of the most effective device developed for secur-
ing the stability of land transactions :39 the land register system, 40 which,
however, has been adopted in only a few civil law countries, viz., in Ger-
38 As to the importance of this point and the underlying policies, cf. Rheinstein, review of
Pierre Lepaulle, "Trait6 th6orique et pratique des trusts," 43 Yale L. J. 1049 (1934).
39 The necessity of a radical simplification of the substantive law of rights in land was recog-
nized and carried out in the English reform legislation of 1924 and 1926.
4o For a comparative survey, see Schollmeyer and E. Heymann, 5 Handw6rterbuch der
Staatswissenschaften 335 (4th ed. 1923), and Percy Bordwell, Land Transfer, 9 Soc. Sci.
Ency. 127 (1933), with further references. Also Planiol, Trait6 616mentaire, nos. 2637-43,
and Predari, 3 Rechtsvergleichendes Handw6rterbuch 186 (1931). On the German system of
land registration, see especially Martin Wolff, op. cit. supra note 33, at 77 ff.; shorter, Strecker,
3 Handw6rterbuch der Rechtswissenschaft 26 (X928).
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many, Austria, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries. 4' In these
countries registration of title is compulsory. A record is kept for every
piece of land, and no transaction can validly be made without registra-
tion. France and the many countries following the French system have
only registration of deeds developed on similar lines as registration of deeds
in this country, though resulting in a greater protection of purchasers be-
cause of the greater simplicity of the substantive law.42
Even the best system of registration of deeds leaves room for a consid-
erable amount of insecurity. Its most serious defect is that it leaves it to
the reader of the records to draw his own legal conclusions, which may or
may not be right, and which will be less conclusive the more complicated
the substantive law.
In a system of registration of titles, on the other hand, the record re-
veals and largely controls the actual legal situations. The register will tell
immediately in whom title is vested, who is a mortgagee, and what the
priorities are. Such a system imposes a high responsibility upon the
staff of officials, who must necessarily be learned in the law. 43
That the introduction of a system of compulsory registration of title
is no easy task is shown by the experiences of France, England, and the
United States. In France, its introduction has been advocated for almost
a century. It has been prevented by the high costs which would be caused
by the necessity of an almost complete remaking of the topographical land
survey. 44 In England, compulsory land registration was confessedly pre-
vented by the conveyancing branch of the legal profession. A strong
government, as it existed in Germany, is necessary to overcome such
difficulties. It may be more than a mere accident that the radical reform
of the English law of real property by Lord Birkenhead's Acts was
achieved during the post-war period when bureaucracy was unusually
strong in England.
Whether or not compulsory registration of title, in the long run,
amounts to a saving or a greater expense for the community when com-
pared with a different system is a problem which should attract further
detailed research. It certainly does away completely with the necessity of
4' As to its history, see Huebner, op. cit. supra note 5, at 218 ft., 241 ff.; Martin Wolff, op.
cit. supra note 33, at 73 if.
42 On the French system of registration of deeds, see 4 Planiol et Rip ert (et Picard), op. cit.
supra note 27, at 604 ff., and, shorter, Planiol, Trait6 6I6mentaire, nos. 26o3 et seq. (r932).
43 Thus in Germany, for instance, the keeping of the land register is entrusted to the
county courts.
44 See Planiol, Trait 6l6mentaire, no. 2635 (1932), with further references.
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title insurance because of the great security and stability it affords for
transactions in land, an object regarded in the civil law countries as the
most important end of the rules of the law of real property. This policy
has been carried out most consistently in Germany. The law of real prop-
erty has been so radically simplified that almost no other rights can exist
in land than are possible in chattels. Future interests in land are just as
restricted as they were with respect to chattels in the classical common
law. The outspoken end of the German codifiers was to assimilate land
transactions as far as possible to transactions in chattels or in stocks.
They have so well succeeded that almost the only criticism uttered against
the real property provisions of the Code is that they facilitate land trans-
actions too much, that they induce the peasants to part too easily with
or to mortgage their land, and that they involve too great a temptation
to speculate in land. Whether or not such criticisms are justified is an
open question.
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